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JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is proper pursuant to Utah Code Ann.

Section

78-2-2(3) (j), 78-2-2(4), and 78-2a-3 (2) (j) .
ISSUES AND STANDARDS
This appeal arises from the district court's entry of
summary judgment on the Plaintiffs' first and second causes of
action and from the district court's dismissal of the Plaintiffs'
third cause of action for failure to prosecute.
Summary judgment is reviewed for correctness without
deference to the district court.
947 P.2d 678, 680 (Utah 1997).

Drysdale v.

Ford Motor

Co.,

Summary Judgment is proper only

when "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ...
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."
Id.
A district court's dismissal for failure to prosecute is
reviewed for abuse of discretion.

Charlie Brown Constr.

co.

v.

Leisure Sports, Inc., 740 P.2d 1368, 1370 (Ct.App.), cert denied,
765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1987).

The district court has broad

discretion in dismissing actions for failure to prosecute and
that decision will not be disturbed without an abuse of
discretion and a likelihood injustice has occurred.
Leasing Corp.

v.

Hartford

State of Utah, 888 P.2d 694, 697 (Utah App.

1994); Charlie Brown Constr.

Co., 740 P.2d at 1370.

1

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, AND RULES
There is no constitutional provision, statute or rule which
is controlling.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case and Proceedings Below.
The Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against Defendant Limb and
Defendant Tylers alleging three causes of action: 1) that an
equitable mortgage was created by the parties entitling the
Plaintiffs to "an unforeclosed equity of redemption," (See
Appellants' Brief at page 26); 2) that the Tylers breached an
agreement in which "in exchange for Tylers' agreement to pay the
Plaintiffs the sum of $20,000, the Plaintiffs agreed to
relinquish their interest" in the properties,

(See Appellants'

Brief at page 21); and 3) that Tylers breached an agreement to
pay to the Plaintiffs $20,000 for a certain water right related
to the properties.

R.

at 382-94.

The Tylers and Limb each filed a motion for summary judgment
concerning the first and second causes of action, which the court
granted.

R.

at 539-59, 590-96, 660-75

Fourteen months later,

Limb filed a Motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs' remaining claims
for failure to prosecute, which the court granted.
99, 715.

R.

at 697-

The Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Set Aside the

Judgment, which the court denied.

R.

at 726-29, 782.

The Plaintiffs appeal the court's grant of summary judgment

2

on the first two causes of action and attack the court's decision
to dismiss the third cause of action for failure to prosecute.
R.

at 773-74, 792-93.

Although the Plaintiffs suggest that the

court erred in denying their Motion to Set Aside the Judgment,
the Plaintiffs fail to brief this issue or offer any legal
support for the allegation.

See Appellants' Brief at 28-31.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
In 1987, the Tylers agreed to loan the Plaintiffs $26,500.00
and the Plaintiffs agreed to transfer to the Tylers by warranty
deed three parcels of property in Washington County.
543-44, 884.

R.

at 62,

In conjunction with this transaction, the

Plaintiffs agreed to make monthly payments for a year to repay
the loan.

R.

at 62, 543-44, 884.

In 1988, the parties agreed

to extend by two years the time for repaying the first loan.
at 545.

R.

At the same time, the Tylers also agreed to make a

second loan to the Plaintiffs in the amount of $30,000.00.
at 63, 73, 544-45.

R.

In return, the Plaintiffs transferred by

warranty deed one additional piece of property in Washington
County.

R.

at 73, 544-45.

In conjunction with this

transaction, the Plaintiffs agreed to make monthly payments for
two years to repay the loan.

R.

at 63, 73, 544-45.

In these

transactions, the parties agreed that the Tylers would retain
ownership of the properties if the Plaintiffs defaulted.
544, 991-92, 1009-10.

R.

at

The Plaintiffs defaulted on both loans.
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R.

at 1014-16.
In 1989, the Plaintiffs filed for bankruptcy.

R.

at 1016.

The Plaintiffs listed as part of their bankruptcy estate an
interest in the four parcels of property (hereinafter the
"properties") deeded to the Tylers in 1987 and 1988.
1016-18.

R.

at

In June, 1990, the Plaintiffs and the Tylers entered

into a stipulation, filed with the bankruptcy court, in which the
parties agreed to list the properties for sale for 21 months.
at 1254, 1021-27.

R.

The proceeds from the sale would be used to

repay the Tylers the money borrowed plus interest and costs and
the remaining balance of the sale would be made a part of the
bankruptcy estate.

R.

at 1254, 1021-27. The Plaintiffs'

attorney negotiated the stipulation with the Tylers, who were not
represented by counsel, and also drafted the document.
1208-09, 1021.

R.

at

The parties agreed that in the event the

properties were not sold within 21 months, the Plaintiffs would
withdraw all claims to the properties, the Tylers would retain
sole ownership of the properties, and the Plaintiffs would
automatically lose their right to the overages from any sale in
the future.

R.

at 1254, 1021-27.

The Plaintiffs, not the

Tylers, insisted on the stipulation..

R.

at 1208-09, 1021.

Eight months after the stipulation was executed, the
Plaintiffs wanted to free the properties from the bankruptcy
court's control so that the properties could be sold and the

4

Plaintiffs could receive the overages, if any, without making the
money available to their creditors.

R.

at 1041-43, 1047.

As

part of their scheme, the Plaintiffs wrote a letter to the
bankruptcy trustee requesting the trustee release the properties
because they had no interest in the properties.
1047, 1049-53.

R.

at 901,

Simultaneously, the Plaintiffs filed an Ex Parte

Motion requesting the bankruptcy court release the properties to
the Tylers because the Tylers were the sole owners of the
properties free from any legal claims by the Plaintiffs.

R.

at

902-03, 1047, 1049-53.
Six months after the Plaintiffs filed their Ex Parte Motion,
the Tylers filed a Request for Abandonment of the properties.
at 95.

R.

Following an investigation of the matter, and after

providing the Plaintiffs an opportunity to be heard on the
matter, the bankruptcy trustee abandoned the properties,
concluding that the Plaintiffs had no interest in the properties
and therefore, the properties should not be part of the
bankruptcy estate.

R.

at 95.

One month after the properties

were abandoned, the Tylers sold the properties to Limb for
$90,000.00.

R.

at 1154.

deeds for the properties.

The Tylers provided Limb warranty
R.

at 550-51.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court correctly concluded that summary judgment
against the Plaintiffs' claims was available on any one of three

5

legal grounds: 1) judicial estoppel; 2) abrogation of mortgage;
and 3) waiver and estoppel.

In addition, although not relied

upon by the trial court, the doctrine of unclean hands bars
Plaintiffs' claims.

It is clearly established that summary

judgment should be affirmed on any legal basis available to the
district court, even if not relied upon by the district court in
granting summary judgment.
836 P.2d 797 (Utah App.

See Town of Alta v. Ben Hame Corp,

1992).

First, judicial estoppel prevents the Plaintiffs from now
claiming a right of redemption in the properties when they
knowingly took a contrary position before the bankruptcy court.
If they were permitted to claim such an interest now after
disclaiming all interest before the bankruptcy court, a fraud
upon the bankruptcy court would result, as well as a fraud on the
creditors of the bankruptcy estate.
Second, the Plaintiffs and the Tylers changed the nature of
their conveyance from an alleged mortgage to an absolute deed by
subsequent agreement.

By agreement, the Plaintiffs extinguished

their interest in the properties, including a right of
redemption, securing only a right to overages, if any, if a sale
occurred within 21 months.

The Plaintiffs cannot now reassert an

equity of redemption.
Third, the parties' subsequent agreement operated as a
waiver of the Plaintiffs' right to redeem.
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The doctrine of

estoppel operates to prevent the Plaintiffs from reasserting a
right to redeem where the Tylers and Limb relied on the
Plaintiffs' waiver of that right.
Finally, Utah courts have uniformly held that a party
seeking equity must do equity.

The Plaintiffs' claim to an

equity of redemption of the properties sounds in equity.

In the

bankruptcy proceedings, the Plaintiffs disclaimed all interest in
the properties, including an equity of redemption, succeeding in
freeing the properties from the bankruptcy court's control.

The

Plaintiffs now claim their disclaimer was a ruse to free the
properties.

Principles of equity bar the Plaintiffs from

maintaining a claim for an equity of redemption.
With respect to the district court's dismissal for failure
to prosecute, the Plaintiffs have not offered any evidence
demonstrating an abuse of discretion.

The record contains

substantial support for the district court's decision to dismiss
for failure to prosecute.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
ENTRY OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF
THE TYLERS WAS PROPER
The trial court correctly concluded that summary judgment
against the Plaintiffs' claims was available on any one of three
legal grounds: 1) the Plaintiffs were judicially estopped from
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asserting a right of redemption because they disclaimed any
interest in the properties in the prior bankruptcy proceedings;
2) even if the original conveyance to the Tylers was a mortgage,
the Plaintiffs and the Tylers, by subsequent agreement, changed
the character of the conveyance to an absolute deed; and 3) the
Plaintiffs waived their right to redeem the properties and
therefore, cannot now reassert that interest.

On appeal, the

Plaintiffs have failed to present any evidence that the material
facts are disputed, or that the court incorrectly applied these
legal rules to the material facts.
Further, principles of equity bar the Plaintiffs claims.
Utah courts have uniformly held that a party who seeks equity
must also do equity.

Although the court did not rely on this

legal theory when entering summary judgment, it is clearly
established that summary judgment should be affirmed on any legal
basis available to the district court, even if not relied upon by
the district court in granting summary judgment.
Alta v.
A.

See Town of

Ben Hame Corp, 836 P.2d 797 (Utah App. 1992).

AS A MATTER OF LAW, THE PLAINTIFFS ARE ESTOPPED FROM
ASSERTING AN INTEREST IN THE PROPERTIES.
The doctrine of judicial estoppel prevents a person from

taking a position that is inconsistent with a position taken in
prior judicial proceedings.

Utah courts have held that:

[a] person may not, to the prejudice of another person deny
any position taken in a prior judicial proceeding between
the same persons or their privies involving the same
8

subject-matter, if such prior position was successfully
maintained.
Salt Lake City v.

Silver Fork Pipeline Corp.. 913 P.2d 731, 734

(Utah 1995) (citing Tracy Loan & Trust Co. v. Openshaw Inv.

Co.,

102 Utah 509, 515, 132 P.2d 388, 390 (1942)).
The purpose of judicial estoppel is "to uphold the sanctity of
oaths, thereby safeguarding the integrity of the judicial process
from conduct such as knowing misrepresentations or fraud on the
court."

Id.

at 734 (citing Wiese v. Wiese. 699 P.2d 700, 704-05

(Utah 1985) (Durham, J., dissenting); and Total Petroleum. Inc.
v. Davis. 822 F.2d 734, 737 n.6 (8th Cir. 1987)).
In this case, it is undisputed that during the bankruptcy
proceedings the Plaintiffs took the position that they had
absolutely no interest in the properties.
51.

R.

at 1041-43, 1047-

On February 11, 1991, the Plaintiffs wrote a letter to the

bankruptcy trustee disclaiming all interest in the properties.
Simultaneously, the Plaintiffs filed an Ex Parte Motion to
release the properties to the Tylers confirming the Tylers are
the sole owners of the property free from any claims by the
Plaintiffs.

R.

at 1041-43, 1047-51.

The Plaintiffs now take a position regarding the properties
completely contrary to the position they took in the bankruptcy
court.

The Plaintiffs claim they are not estopped from

maintaining an interest in the properties because the Tylers did
not rely on the statements to the bankruptcy trustee and to the
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bankruptcy court.

The Plaintiffs argue that because the Tylers

drafted a letter upon which the Plaintiffs patterned their letter
to the bankruptcy trustee, they are somehow prevented from
relying on the Plaintiffs' statements to the bankruptcy trustee
and to bankruptcy court.

Bare allegations alone are insufficient

to withstand a summary judgment motion.

See Dwiggins v. Morgan

Jewelers, 811 P.2d 182, 183 (Utah 1991).
Here, the letter only demonstrates that the Tylers were
aware of the basis of the Plaintiffs' disclaimer of interest—
that because the Plaintiffs defaulted, the Tylers obtained sole
ownership in the properties free from any claims by the
Plaintiffs.

The letter does not indicate that the Tylers were

aware of any possible legal claim the Plaintiffs could have made
to the property.

In fact, Mr. Tyler's deposition testimony

clearly contradicts such a contention:
Q.
Okay. Mr. Tyler, do you understand that when real
estate is pledged as security for the payment of an
obligation, that those people who pledged theat real estate
have the right to redeem that real estate within a certain
period of time, even though they may default on their
obligation?
A.
No. My understanding is that when they default in
four or five ways over a long period of time, I feel just
like Mary Anne, I told you here a few minutes ago, the
property is theirs.
Q.
So you are not aware of any legal principle
protecting the person who pledges the property?
MR. RUSSELL: Objection. Calls for a legal conclusion
from the witness.
MR. PENDLETON:
I'm not asking him for a
conclusion. I'm asking if he's aware of any legal
principle.
MR. RUSSELL: And it's argumentative.
10

THE WITNESS:

Not that I know of, I guess.

I don't

know.
R.

at 1222.
In addition, Plaintiff Penn Smith's own deposition testimony

demonstrates the Tylers were not privy to a scheme by the
Plaintiffs to defraud the bankruptcy court and the bankruptcy
trustee.

The following excerpts from Plaintiff Penn Smith's

deposition demonstrates that to advance a scheme to defraud the
bankruptcy court and the bankruptcy trustee, the Plaintiffs took
advantage of the Tylers' genuine belief of ownership in the
properties:
Q.
Now, is it correct the reason you were sending
this letter to Mr. Gillman [the bankruptcy trustee] was to
convince him to have the properties released out of the
bankruptcy?
A.
The purpose I wrote this letter was because we had
been converted to a Chapter 7 involuntarily, and I was
trying to get out of the Chapter 7 bankruptcy. And I was
trying to get everything I could out of the Chapter 7
bankruptcy, and that's essentially why I wrote the letter.
Between what Mr. Tyler and I discussed he would do if he did
send this letter, it fit in with me trying to get out of the
bankruptcy, which I finally succeeded in doing.
Q.
My question was the reason you sent this to Mr.
Gillman was to convince him to have these particular parcels
of property taken out of your bankruptcy?
A.
That's correct.
R.

at 1047.
Q.
And at the top it says, Comes now the Debtor in
propria persona and moves the Court release the real
property belonging to R. H. Tyler and I. W. Tyler out of the
bankruptcy. Is that correct?
A.
That's correct.
Q.
And the reason you filed this document, again, was
so that the Bankruptcy Court would release the property
from the bankruptcy to the Tylers?
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A.

That's correct.

at 1049.
Q.
Well, did you make any disclosures to the
Bankruptcy Court when you filed this motion to release the
properties to the Tylers that you still claimed some
interest in it?
A.
I didn't make any disclosure to that effect that I
can see.
Q.
In fact, you didn't tell the bankruptcy trustee
that you still claimed an interest in the property?
A.
I filed a claim of interest in it in the beginning
of the bankruptcy.
Q.
Right. But then you asked the bankruptcy —
A.
To release it.
Q.
— to release it because you didn't claim an
interest anymore?
A.
I didn't say I didn't claim an interest in it. I
didn't say I did. I didn't say I didn't.
Q.
Let me refer you back to Exhibit 15. The second
to last paragraph -- we went over this a minute ago -- but
it says, We now know that the advice we received from Mr.
Petty to include these properties in our bankruptcy was bad
advice for we really had no claim to them. Do you see that?
A.
Yeah.
Q.
So that statement was not true?
A.
Well, it evidently wasn't. It doesn't look like
it. It looks like to me it was a mistake or error.
t 1050-51.
Q.
My question goes to whether you had a claim to the
property or not because this says that you had no claim to
the property. And I want to know whether that statement is
true or not.
A.
I believe I had a claim to the property. I'll
have to tell you that. I believe I had a claim to the
property ever since I first borrowed money on the property.
Q.
After you sent this letter of February 11, 1991,
to Mr. Gillman you never indicated to the Bankruptcy Court
or to Mr. Gillman that you still had a -- you still made a
claim to the property; is that correct?
A.
I believe at that time I had already filed to
dismiss the petition, and I was trying in all ways I knew,
being a pro se litigant and not being lawyer trained, to get
it dismissed out of the bankruptcy, and this is one of the
vehicles I was trying to use.
12

R. at 1052.
Plaintiff Penn Smith's testimony demonstrates that the
Plaintiffs' written statements to the bankruptcy court were not
simply "a layman's expression of a legal opinion,." (See
Appellants' Brief at 16) but, rather, they were part of a scheme
devised by the Plaintiffs to defraud the bankruptcy court.

The

testimony also demonstrates Plaintiff Penn Smith's willingness to
lie or equivocate to get what he wants.

Finally, the testimony

demonstrates that the Tylers were not privy to Plaintiffs'
scheme.
In reliance upon the Plaintiffs' representations, the Tylers
sold the properties to Limb.1

R.

at 1154, 1223, 1224-26.

The

Tylers reliance on the Plaintiffs' representations is evidenced
by the Tylers' use of warranty deeds to transfer the property to
Limb.

The Tylers' reliance was genuine.
Because the Plaintiffs knowingly disclaimed all interest in

the properties, they are estopped from reasserting an interest.
If they were permitted to claim such an interest now, they would
succeed in committing a fraud upon the bankruptcy court as well

]

The properties were sold for $90,000.00, which was only $3,500,00 less than the value
attributed to the properties by Sam Sampson, the Plaintiffs' nephew, who was appointed by the
bankruptcy court to list the properties for sale. See letter from Sam Sampson dated May 1, 1991,
which is attached in Appendix 1. His valuation was based on the highest offers made on the
properties over a long period of time, but which could not be accepted and consummated because
of the bankruptcy proceedings. See Sam Sampson letter, Appendix 1. The properties did not sell
for enough to even pay the debt in full to the Tylers. R. at 920.
13

as a fraud on the creditors of the bankruptcy estate.

As the

trial court concluded, the Plaintiff's deposition testimony
clearly shows that judicial estoppel is necessary here to prevent
a fraud on the bankruptcy court.

R.

at 660-75.

The foregoing material facts are undisputed.

As a matter of

law, judicial estoppel prevents the Plaintiffs from disavowing
their prior representations to the bankruptcy court.

Summary

judgment against the Plaintiffs was, therefore, proper.
B.

AS A MATTER OF LAW, PLAINTIFFS CHANGED THE NATURE OF THE
CONVEYANCE TO A DEED ABSOLUTE, BARRING A CLAIM FOR AN
INTEREST IN THE PROPERTIES.
Where parties enter into a mortgage in the form of a deed

absolute, they may subsequently abrogate the mortgage by
agreement:
The general rule is that where a mortgage is in the form of
a deed absolute or a conditional sale, the parties may by a
subsequent agreement abandon the debt, cancel the agreement
to reconvey, and thus change the character of the
transaction from that of a mortgage to that of an absolute
conveyance; and although there is authority to the contrary,
this rule has even been held applicable in the case of a
subsequent parol agreement.
55 Am.

Jur.

2d, Mortgages 520, at 508 (1971).

By agreement, the parties to an equitable mortgage can change the
conveyance from a mortgage to a deed absolute, abrogating the
grantor's right of redemption.
In June, 1990, the Plaintiffs and the Tylers entered into a
stipulation in which the parties agreed that the Tylers could
sell the properties and the Plaintiffs would only be entitled to
14

receive any sale proceeds remaining after the debt to the Tylers
was fully satisfied.

R.

at 895.

If the properties were sold

for an amount less than the debt, the Plaintiffs would receive
nothing.

R.

at 895.

If a sale did not occur within 21 months,

the Plaintiffs agreed that the Tylers would retain sole ownership
of the properties free of any claim by the Plaintiffs.
895.

R.

at

The only way the Plaintiffs could recover the properties

would have been to repurchase the property from the Tylers within
21 months.

R.

at 895.

By this agreement, the Plaintiffs extinguished any interest
they had in the properties, including a right of redemption,
securing only a right to the overages, if any.

The Tylers

received sole ownership in the properties subject only to an
obligation to pay the overages, if any, if a sale occurred within
21 months.

By this agreement, the transaction became an absolute

conveyance with a right of repurchase.
the Tylers, insisted on the stipulation.

Note, the Plaintiffs, not
R.

at 1021, 1208-09.

The Plaintiffs' situation in this case is similar to the
defendant's situation in Sauer v.
1929).

Fischer, 225 N.W. 518 (Mich.

In Sauer, the defendant mortgaged the property in the

form of an absolute deed.
sued for quiet title.

Subsequent purchasers of the property

The trial court ruled that by subsequent

agreement, the defendant changed the nature of the transaction
from a mortgage to a deed absolute.
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The defendant appealed

claiming a right of redemption insisting the plaintiffs were
merely mortgagees.

The Michigan Supreme Court affirmed the trial

court stating:
[i]t is well established that a deed, given as a mortgage,
may be changed by subsequent agreement of the parties into
an absolute deed.
Id.

at 519.
The interesting point of Sauer is the appellate court's

statement concerning the nature of the transaction between the
defendant and the original grantees.

The court stated:

[i]f personal liability to pay the debt is extinguished and
it is optional with the grantor to rescue the property by
payment, or relinquish it by nonpayment, it is an absolute
sale with privilege of repurchase, and not a mortgage.
Id.

at 519.
In this case, the Plaintiffs voluntarily extinguished their

interest in the properties, securing only a right to receive
overages, if any, if the properties sold within 21 months.

By

agreement, the Plaintiffs' only possibility for obtaining the
properties was through repurchase within 21 months.

If they

didn't repurchase the properties and if the properties were not
sold, the Tylers would retain the properties free of any claim by
the Plaintiffs.
The June 13, 1991 agreement is undisputed.

As a matter of

law, the Plaintiffs and the Tylers changed the nature of the
conveyance from a mortgage to an absolute deed.

The Plaintiffs

secured only a right to receive overages, if any, if a sale
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occurred within 21 months, and relinquished their interest in the
properties, including their right of redemption.

Hence, summary

judgment against the Plaintiffs on their first cause of action
seeking an equity of redemption was proper.

Further, summary

judgment against the Plaintiffs on their second cause of action
for breach of contract seeking $20,000.00 in exchange for their
interest in the properties also was proper.
With respect to their second cause of action, the Plaintiffs
allege that on August 19, 1991, the parties entered into a new
agreement as follows:

"in exchange for Tylers' agreement to pay

plaintiffs the sum of $20,000, plaintiffs agreed to relinquish
their interest ^in order to facilitate the sale of the property
to Tylers' purchaser.'"

See Appellants' Brief at 20-21.

According to the Plaintiffs, this alleged agreement creates a
question of fact precluding summary judgment of the Plaintiffs'
second cause of action for breach of contract.

Nevertheless,

this alleged agreement does not preclude summary judgment.
It is well settled that "[i]f there is lack of
consideration, there is no contract."

Copper State Leasing

Company v. Blacker Appliance & Furniture Company, 770 P.2d 88, 91
(Utah 1988).
For a promise to be legally enforceable, it must be
supported by consideration. Consideration is an act or
promise, bargained for and given in exchange for a promise.
Promises made by a party pursuant to a bilateral contract to
do an act or to forbear from doing an act that would be
detrimental to the promisor or beneficial to the promisee
17

may constitute the consideration for the other's promise.
Resource Management Co.

v. Weston Ranch and Livestock Co., Inc..

706 P.2d 1028, 1036 (Utah 1985).
Here, the Plaintiffs allege that in exchange for the Tylers'
promise to pay the Plaintiffs $20,000.00, the Plaintiffs'
promised to relinquish their interest in the properties.
Appellants' Brief at 20-21.

See

However, since, by stipulation, the

Plaintiffs had already relinquished any interest they had in the
properties, retaining only a right to overages, if any, the
Plaintiffs' alleged promise on August 19, 1991 to relinquish
their interest in the properties could not support the Tylers'
alleged promise to pay the Plaintiffs $20,000.00.
1024-27.

R.

at 895,

Since the Tylers' alleged promise was not supported by

consideration, the alleged agreement is unenforceable.

Summary

judgment on the Plaintiffs' second cause of action for breach of
contract was, therefore, proper.
C.

AS A MATTER OF LAW, THE PLAINTIFFS WAIVED THEIR RIGHT TO
ASSERT AN INTEREST IN THE PROPERTIES.
Waiver is the voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a

known right.

See Beckstead v.

Deseret Roofing Co.

Inc., 831

P.2d 130 (Utah Ct.App. 1992).
After defaulting on their payments, the Plaintiffs waived
their right to redeem, agreeing that the Tylers could sell the
properties or, after 21 months, keep them free of any claim by
Plaintiffs.

R.

at 895, 1024-27.
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The Plaintiffs secured only a

right to receive overages, if any, if the properties were sold
within 21 months.

R.

at 895, 1024-27.

The doctrine of estoppel operates to prevent the Plaintiffs
from reasserting a right to redeem where the Tylers and Limb have
relied on the Plaintiffs' waiver of that right.

The elements of

estoppel are:
(I) a statement, admission, act, or failure to act by one
party inconsistent with a claim later asserted; (ii)
reasonable action or inaction by the other party taken or
not taken on the basis of the first party's statement,
admission, act, or failure to act; and (iii) injury to the
second party that would result from allowing the first party
to contradict or repudiate such statement, admission, act,
or failure to act.
S&G Inc.

v.

Intermountain Power Agency, 913 P.2d 735, 742 (Utah

1996) .
The Tylers relied to their detriment on the Plaintiffs'
waiver of their right to redeem by selling the properties to Mr.
Limb and transferring the properties by warranty deed.

The

Plaintiffs are estopped from now revoking their waiver and
bringing an action which reasserts that right.
material to waiver and estoppel are undisputed.

The facts
Accordingly,

summary judgment on the Plaintiffs' first and second causes of
action was proper on these grounds as well.
D.

THE PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY THE DOCTRINE OF UNCLEAN
HANDS.
Summary judgment should also be affirmed on the doctrine of

unclean hands.

Although the district court did not rely on this
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principle for entering summary judgment, it is clearly
established that summary judgment should be affirmed on any legal
basis available to the district court, even if not relied upon by
the district court in granting summary judgment.
Alta v,

See Town of

Ben Hame Corp, 836 P.2d 797 (Utah App. 1992).

The doctrine of unclean hands operates to require a party
requesting equity to do equity.

Courts uniformly hold that a

party whose conduct has been inequitable is not entitled to
obtain equity.
The Plaintiffs claim to an equity of redemption is naturally
a claim in equity to which the doctrine of unclean hands applies.
Here, the Plaintiffs successfully defrauded the bankruptcy court,
the bankruptcy trustee and the bankruptcy creditors by
disclaiming all interest in the properties.

Such conduct, as a

matter of law, bars the Plaintiffs from now maintaining a claim
for an equity of redemption against the Tylers.
POINT II
LIMB'S MOTION TO DISMISS WAS PROPERLY BEFORE THE
COURT AND THE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
IN DISMISSING THE PLAINTIFFS' REMAINING CLAIMS
FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE
A.

THE MOTION WAS PROPERLY BEFORE THE COURT.
The reason for the doctrine of standing was explained by the

Utah Supreme Court in Terracor v.

The Utah Board of State Lands

& Forrestry, 716 P.2d 796 (Utah 1986):

20

The doctrine or [sic] standing is intended to assure the
procedural integrity of judicial adjudications by requiring
that the parties to a lawsuit have a sufficient interest in
the subject matter of the dispute and sufficient adverseness
that the legal and factual issues which must be resolved
will be thoroughly explored.
Id.

at 798.
In Terracor, the Court referred to three general standards

for determining whether a litigant has standing.

First, the

"plaintiff must be able to show that he has suffered some
distinct and palpable injury that gives him a personal stake in
the outcome of the legal dispute."

Second, "if a plaintiff does

not have standing under the first criterion, he may have standing
if no one else has a greater interest in the outcome of the case
and the issues are unlikely to be raised at all unless that
particular plaintiff has standing to raise the issue."

Third,

"even though standing is not found to exist under the first two
criteria, a plaintiff may nonetheless have standing if the issues
are unique and of such great public importance that they ought to
be decided in furtherance of the public interest."

Id.

at 798.

The doctrine of standing primarily applies to a person's
ability to bring a lawsuit.

Nevertheless, Limb satisfied the

requirements for standing set forth by the Utah Supreme Court.
The first general standard applies in this case.

Limb was a

party to the action because the Plaintiffs pled him as a party
and asserted claims against him.

As a party in the action and as

the owner of the properties, Limb had a personal stake in the
21

outcome of the case and, therefore, a personal stake in any
motion brought in the action, especially a motion to dismiss.
At the time Limb brought the motion to dismiss,
approximately 14 months had passed since summary judgment was
granted on two of the Plaintiffs' three causes of action.
697-99.

R.

at

Although summary judgment was granted denying the

Plaintiffs' equity of redemption, the lis pendens filed against
the properties continued to cloud Limb's title.

R.

at 697-99.

Limb's motion requested that the remaining claims be dismissed
for lack of prosection thereby creating a final appealable order.
R.

at 697-99.

If the Motion to Dismiss were denied, Limb

requested, in the alternative, that the summary judgment order be
certified as a final judgment under Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure.

R.

at 697-99.

After a hearing on the

matter, the district court granted the Motion to Dismiss stating:
[T]he court finds that the summary judgment was filed in May
of 1995 and nothing further has been done on this case. The
court grants the Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute
and orders the summary judgment certified as final so that
appeal can go forward.
R.

at 715.
Plaintiffs suggest the trial court granted the alternative

remedy before granting the dismissal and therefore, the moment
the trial court granted the alternative remedy, Limb no longer
had standing to pursue the dismissal.
29.

See Appellants' Brief at

The trial court's minute entry clearly demonstrates that the
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trial court granted the motion to dismiss first, and as part of
the dismissal ordered the summary judgment certified as final for
appeal.

R.

at 715.

In addition, Limb's standing to bring the motion is
determined at the time the motion was filed, not in the middle of
the court's oral decree.

Once the motion was before the court,

the court could rule on it.

Furthermore, even if a motion to

dismiss is not brought by a party, the court can still dismiss
the matter on its own motion.

Accordingly, the motion to dismiss

was properly before the trial court.
B.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN GRANTING THE
MOTION.
The district court has broad discretion in dismissing

actions for failure to prosecute and that decision will not be
disturbed without an abuse of discretion and a likelihood
injustice has occurred.

Hartford, 888 P.2d 694, 697 (Utah App.

1994); Charlie Brown Constr.

Co., 740 P.2d at 1370.

The Plaintiffs argue that the court abused its discretion by
granting the motion to dismiss without giving notice to the
Plaintiffs and without sufficient grounds.
at 29-30.

See Appellants' Brief

However, the record is clear that the Plaintiffs had

notice of the motion to dismiss and simply ineffectively opposed
the motion.

R.

at 705-08, 711-12, 727-28, 746-49.

Limb filed his motion to dismiss on July 22, 1996.
697-99.

R.

at

Despite Limb dedicating four pages to factual and legal
23

support of the motion, the Plaintiffs filed an objection to the
motion containing only two sentences.

R.

at 705.

The

Plaintiffs did, however, request a hearing for September 9, 1996.
R.

at 707-08.

Clearly, the Plaintiffs' failure to provide

factual and legal support in its written objection to the motion
meant the Plaintiffs would need to present competent oral
argument at the time of hearing if it expected the court to be
aware of any facts necessary to consider denying the motion.
More than a month before the hearing, the court continued
the hearing for two weeks.

R. at 711-12.

Nevertheless, the

Plaintiffs' attorney did not appear for the hearing, sending in
his place an associate.

R.

at 715, 746-49.

The associate did

not assert any justification for the Plaintiffs' inaction in
moving the case forward in the 14 months since summary judgment.
R.

at 728, 747.

In fact, the Plaintiffs' counsel acknowledges

sending the associate without briefing him on the case.
Appellants' Brief at 12.

See

Without any justification for

inactivity and faced with the prejudice Limb continued to suffer
by the delay, the court granted the motion to dismiss.

The

Plaintiffs argue that the court abused its discretion granting
the motion; however, the Plaintiffs fail to offer any evidence
tending to show that the court's decision was without support in
the record.

In fact, the record clearly evidences that in

response to the motion, the Plaintiffs failed to present the
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court any justification for the delay and continued prejudice to
Limb.

It's not an abuse of the court's discretion when a party

refuses to diligently advocate its interests.

A court is not

required to protect a party from the party's own indolence.
C.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION DENYING
PLAINTIFFS' RULE 60(B) MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE JUDGMENT.
The Plaintiffs listed as an issue for appeal the district

court's denial of Plaintiffs' Rule 60(b) motion; however, the
Plaintiffs have failed to brief this issue on appeal.

It is

uniformly held that an appellate court will decline to consider
an issue that has not been briefed:
It is well established that an appellate court will decline
to consider an argument that a party has failed to
adequately brief. See State
v. Price,
909 P.2d 256, 263
[*15]
(Ct. App. 1995),
cert, denied, 916 P.2d 909 (Utah
1996);
State
v. Wareham, 772 P. 2d 960, 966 (Utah 1989)
(declining to address issue where "brief wholly lacks legal
analysis and authority to support . . . argument"). Because
of inadequate analysis, we decline to address Paul
Valcarce's claim on appeal.
Valcarce v.

Fitzgerald, 331 Utah Adv.

Rep 68, 15 (Ct.

App.

1997) .
Similarly, Plaintiffs' claim regarding the trial court's refusal
to set aside the judgment should not be addressed on this appeal.
Even if this Court decides to consider this issue, it is
clear that the district court did not abuse its discretion
denying the Plaintiffs' Motion to Set Aside the Judgment.

Rule

60(b) provides that a judgment may be set aside on the following
grounds:
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(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
(2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could
not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial
under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated
intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other
misconduct of an adverse party; (4) when, for any cause, the
summons in an action has not been personally served upon the
defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has
failed to appear in said action; (5) the judgment is void;
(6) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or
discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has
been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer
equitable that the judgment should have prospective
application; or (7) any other reason justifying relief from
the operation of the judgment.
Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
The Plaintiffs' Motion to Set Aside the Judgment failed to
offer any of the grounds listed in Rule 60(b).

R.

at 726-29.

Furthermore, Plaintiffs and their attorney failed to appear at
the hearing and offer additional support for their motion.

R.

at 782.
The only basis alleged for the claimed relief from judgment
was: "Plaintiffs submit that had the court been aware of the
ongoing negotiations and good faith efforts which were being made
to resolve the outstanding claims, the court would have never
ordered them dismissed for failure to prosecute." R.

at 728.

Plaintiffs' supposition that the court did not take into account
all circumstances does not address the possible grounds listed in
Rule 60(b) and, therefore, does not constitute grounds to set
aside the judgment.

Plaintiffs' motion to set aside was,

therefore, properly denied.
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CONCLUSION
The trial court's granting of summary judgment against
Plaintiffs on their first and second causes of action was proper.
The trial court's dismissal of Plaintiffs' third cause of action
for failure to prosecute and refusal to set aside the judgment
was also property.

Defendants respectfully request this Court

affirm the decisions of the trial court.
DATED THIS 27th day of April, 1998.
DIXON & TRUMAN, a P.C.

NATHAN K. FISHER, ESQ.
Attorneys for Defendant Tylers
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing, postage prepaid, to the following this 27th day of
April, 1998.
Doug Terry
Attorney for Plaintiffs
150 North 200 East
Suite 202
St. George, Utah 84770
Ronald Russell
Attorney for Mr. Limb
185 South State Street, Suite 1300
P.O. Box 11019
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0019
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APPENDIX 1
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May 1, 1991

Blaine Walker
1414 East Murray Holiday Road
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
Dear Blaine:
As per your request, I am writing to give you a market value of
properties owned by Tim Tyler, which have been involved with the
Penn Smith bankruptcy.
As you are aware, there are 4 separate
properties; 2 RV lots & 2 industrial lots. We have had offers on
these properties in the last 30 days, one of which was submitted to
you, but the time frame made it impossible for the court to perform
on it.
Concerning values, the lots in the RV park would be $11,750 each.
The offer submitted to you was for $11,750.
The industrial ground is two parcels, 1.71 acres and 1.25 acre. We
had an offer from a local contractor at $40,000 for the 1.75 and
$30,000 for the 1.25 piece. Because of the problem with the RV lot
delivering title and expediency the sales were not consummated.

TjpYoiii>ft^iiMwn^fcih^^nnit>a 1..^n l M^F - o f U a U ^ a ^
with a net of about $80,000, after closing costs. Mr. Tyler would
get about what is his out of pocket layout to Penn Smith.
These are the highest and best offers we have had in a very long
time, maybe not again for sometime to come. I hope you can help us
with this so we can get on with future sales.
Sincerely,

Sam Sampson
Associate Broker

